Saturday, November 04, 2006
Treatise on Atonement p. 184-186
Against these statements I argue, if, in order for the greatest possible happiness to exist, the greatest possible misery must also exist, I wish to reverse the subject. Then the proposition would stand thus, in order for the greatest possible evil to exist the greatest possible good must exist. Then, if God, in his universal plan, has produced as much good as was possible, lie lias also produced as much evil as possible, which renders the statement, that he consulted the greatest possible evil, as just, as that he consulted the greatest possible good. Of course, there is no more propriety in calling him good, than there is in calling him bad!
If it be said I carry this evil, or misery, too far, even beyond my opponent's meaning, I will endeavor to show him, according to his own statement, that I do not. He says, every degree of misery in hell will produce many degrees of happiness in heaven ; if so, if the wretched be not made as miserable as possible, the blessed cannot be made as happy as possible; if they are not made as happy as possible, they must experience some want; and, of course, some misery themselves. .On the other hand, if the wretched be not as miserable as possible, they must have in possession some remaining convenience. Then, neither the greatest possible happiness, nor the greatest possible misery is produced.
Almighty God, being put to the necessity of making some of his rational offspring eternally miserable in order to make the rest forever happy, may be represented by a parent who has ten children, but only provisions enough to preserve the lives of five until he could get more. In this awful dilemma he sits down to consult the greatest possible good; says to. himself, if I divide my provisions equally among my children, all must surely starve to death; but by neglecting five, I can save the lives of the other five, which he finally concludes to do. But I ask the rational, I petition the reasonable, I request the impartial, to guess the feelings of a father on such an occasion! Before him are ten children, all in the image of himself; he sees his own eyes roll in their heads, hears his own voice on their tongues, while his own blood frolics through their veins; how could he make the division? how could he decide on one for a victim ? Would he not rather give his own flesh to be their meat, and his own blood to be their drink, and fervently pray for plenty? But is the Almighty poor? Has he not enough and to spare? When the prodigal came home, did the father turn away his brother so that he might have a plenty for him? Is there not fulness enough in God to satisfy the wants of all his creatures? Why the necessity, then, of making some miserable eternally? My opponent will say, the blessed are happified in consequence of the misery of the wretched. . But what reason can be given for such an idea ? How do we look on a person in this world who manifests joy and happiness in the misery of one of his fellow-creatures? Do we say he manifests a godlike disposition? Surely no. From whence came charity; from heaven, or hell? If souls in heaven possess it, they cannot be happy in consequence of the misery of any rational being; and should the divine principle be found in hell, it would banish misery, and annihilate the place!
Again, if a soul in heaven derives happiness from seeing, say, one-half, or two-thirds, of the human race in misery, would he not yet enjoy more, providing the whole, except himself, were in the same torment? If it be granted that he would, then, in order for a soul to be made as happy as possible, the whole human race, except that one, must be endlessly as miserable as possible! If it be argued that it is not the number or multitudes of individuals who are made miserable that thus constitutes or enhances the happiness of the blessed, but that it is the nature, justice and intense-ness of this misery which is necessary for the above purpose, it makes it very plain that the eternal misery of one would produce as much good as of ten thousand, or more.
We have now got so far, even on our opponent's ground, as to see that there is no need of more than one soul's being endlessly miserable; and it still further appears to me that the misery of one may be dispensed with without departing from what my opponent has acknowledged; and that by letting each individual of the human race for a moment, or any limited time, experience the nature of the misery contended for; and then giving them a memory to retain it fresh in mind forever; this must of necessity produce the effect as well, and without the expense of a single soul. I do not think it would absolutely require omniscient wisdom to concert a better plan than the one I am opposing.
If it be said I carry this evil, or misery, too far, even beyond my opponent's meaning, I will endeavor to show him, according to his own statement, that I do not. He says, every degree of misery in hell will produce many degrees of happiness in heaven ; if so, if the wretched be not made as miserable as possible, the blessed cannot be made as happy as possible; if they are not made as happy as possible, they must experience some want; and, of course, some misery themselves. .On the other hand, if the wretched be not as miserable as possible, they must have in possession some remaining convenience. Then, neither the greatest possible happiness, nor the greatest possible misery is produced.
Almighty God, being put to the necessity of making some of his rational offspring eternally miserable in order to make the rest forever happy, may be represented by a parent who has ten children, but only provisions enough to preserve the lives of five until he could get more. In this awful dilemma he sits down to consult the greatest possible good; says to. himself, if I divide my provisions equally among my children, all must surely starve to death; but by neglecting five, I can save the lives of the other five, which he finally concludes to do. But I ask the rational, I petition the reasonable, I request the impartial, to guess the feelings of a father on such an occasion! Before him are ten children, all in the image of himself; he sees his own eyes roll in their heads, hears his own voice on their tongues, while his own blood frolics through their veins; how could he make the division? how could he decide on one for a victim ? Would he not rather give his own flesh to be their meat, and his own blood to be their drink, and fervently pray for plenty? But is the Almighty poor? Has he not enough and to spare? When the prodigal came home, did the father turn away his brother so that he might have a plenty for him? Is there not fulness enough in God to satisfy the wants of all his creatures? Why the necessity, then, of making some miserable eternally? My opponent will say, the blessed are happified in consequence of the misery of the wretched. . But what reason can be given for such an idea ? How do we look on a person in this world who manifests joy and happiness in the misery of one of his fellow-creatures? Do we say he manifests a godlike disposition? Surely no. From whence came charity; from heaven, or hell? If souls in heaven possess it, they cannot be happy in consequence of the misery of any rational being; and should the divine principle be found in hell, it would banish misery, and annihilate the place!
Again, if a soul in heaven derives happiness from seeing, say, one-half, or two-thirds, of the human race in misery, would he not yet enjoy more, providing the whole, except himself, were in the same torment? If it be granted that he would, then, in order for a soul to be made as happy as possible, the whole human race, except that one, must be endlessly as miserable as possible! If it be argued that it is not the number or multitudes of individuals who are made miserable that thus constitutes or enhances the happiness of the blessed, but that it is the nature, justice and intense-ness of this misery which is necessary for the above purpose, it makes it very plain that the eternal misery of one would produce as much good as of ten thousand, or more.
We have now got so far, even on our opponent's ground, as to see that there is no need of more than one soul's being endlessly miserable; and it still further appears to me that the misery of one may be dispensed with without departing from what my opponent has acknowledged; and that by letting each individual of the human race for a moment, or any limited time, experience the nature of the misery contended for; and then giving them a memory to retain it fresh in mind forever; this must of necessity produce the effect as well, and without the expense of a single soul. I do not think it would absolutely require omniscient wisdom to concert a better plan than the one I am opposing.
